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14 September 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Resume of OCB Luncheon Meeting, 14 September 1960

PRESENT: Mr. Douglas, Mr. Dulles, Mr. Gray, Mr. Harr,
Mr. McCone, Mr. Merchant, Mr. Scribner, Mr. Knight

1. Hiroshima and Nagasaki Bombs

Mr. McCone told the Board that pressure to arrange the release of photographs or scale representations of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs has now shifted from Representative Porter to Representative Moss. He said that he proposed a reply to Mr. Moss to the effect that, although the material requested is no longer classified, the Atomic Energy Commission continues to believe that it would not be in the best interest of the U.S. to make it public at this time. Further, the AEC proposed to tell Mr. Moss that since it appears evident that he feels the best interests of the country would be furthered by such a release, the AEC would welcome being apprised of his reasons and would be glad to reconsider the question after receipt of comments from Mr. Moss.

2. Project SAMOS

The Board then turned to a long discussion of various aspects of Project SAMOS.

A number of opinions were expressed on the question of the public position which the U.S. Government should take toward all aspects of the project. Some members felt that it would be advisable to handle publicity in a very low key and with a minimum of fanfare. On the other hand, others felt that it would be useful to present the project boldly, including a coverage of it in the President's speech to the U.N., so as to attempt to establish a favorable public opinion framework before the actual launching of the first SAMOS satellite.

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There was also a difference of opinion expressed as to whether - assuming the adoption of the bold and forthright approach - photographs received from SAMOS should be made public, and if so whether this should be accomplished through the mechanism of the U. N.

Mr. Merchant noted that the State Department has appointed a committee to examine the pros and cons of both approaches.

There was agreement among the Board members that no slippage in dates for various phases of the project should be contrived for propaganda reasons, although it was recognized that some slippage will probably be inevitable for technical reasons.

3. Presence of Communist Leaders at the U. N.

There was extensive discussion of ways and means of minimizing the possible effect on world opinion of various statements which it is expected will be made by Khrushchev and other Soviet bloc and neutralist leaders, using the sounding board of the General Assembly meeting in New York.

Mr. Dulles urged that the U. S. should take the lead in decrying the presence of Jonas Kadar as the representative of an illegally-constituted government, as the "butcher of Budapest," etc. He also said he considers it important that this country not ease any of the travel restrictions that have been imposed on certain leaders, nor should it in any way apologize for having taken these measures.

There was also some discussion as to the desirability of suggesting to representatives of media such as TV, that they treat Khrushchev and others in a somewhat restrained fashion. There was no agreement on this point.

4. Soviet Space Activities


The DCI outlined some of the possibilities for dramatic space activities which the Soviets might be in the process of attempting to achieve as background for the opening of the General Assembly session.

In this general connection Mr. Douglas suggested, and the Board concurred, that a radar alert should be maintained so as to assure us

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of advance information on the expected launching of a Soviet ICBM in the near future. This might enable the U.S. to announce such a shot before the Soviets themselves, and thereby contribute to the public image of an alert U.S. defense system.



ALLEN W. DULLES
Director

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